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How Much Statehood Does It Take – and What For?
Tanja A. Börzel
Abstract
This paper explores how much statehood it takes to make governance with/out the state work. 
The first part discusses the relationship between governance, state, and statehood. The dis-
tinction between governance as structure and governance as process allows us to disentangle 
state and statehood. The second part of the paper explores the different functions statehood 
has for governance. While there may be functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, 
there is more to statehood than the threat of hierarchically imposed regulation. Effective 
and legitimate governance may require at least some (external) form of consolidated state-
hood. The final part of the paper discusses varieties of statehood, arguing that the challenge 
for areas of limited statehood is not the lack of exclusivity of statehood but the need for an 
order of shared and divided statehood. The paper concludes by considering the dark sides 
of statehood, cautioning against building states without strengthening the rule of law and 
democracy.
Zusammenfassung
Das Papier diskutiert, wie viel Staatlichkeit es braucht, damit Governance mit sowie ohne 
Staat funktionieren kann. Im ersten Teil wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Governance, Staat 
und Staatlichkeit thematisiert. Der zweite Teil des Papiers untersucht die unterschiedlichen 
Funktionen von Staatlichkeit für Governance. Während es durchaus funktionale Äquivalente 
zum Schatten der Hierarchie gibt, besteht Staatlichkeit aus mehr als der Fähigkeit, einseitig 
kollektiv verbindliche Regelungen zu festzulegen und durchzusetzen. Effektives und legitimes 
Regieren verlangt deshalb zumindest eine (externe) Form von konsolidierter Staatlichkeit. Im 
letzten Teil werden unterschiedliche Formen von Staatlichkeit vorgestellt. Dabei wird klar, 
dass die Herausforderung für Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit nicht im Mangel an Exklusivität, 
sondern im Bedarf an einer Ordnung für geteilte Staatlichkeit besteht. Das Papier schließt 
mit einer Betrachtung der Schattenseiten von (ungebundener) Staatlichkeit und warnt vor 
einem einseitigen ‚State-Building‘, das nicht gleichzeitig Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit 
stärkt.
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1. Introduction
The concept of governance has enjoyed quite a career, not least because it allows scholars to 
conceive of politics beyond the state. In the 1970s, literature in comparative policy and politics 
showed that corporate self-regulation and public-private co-regulation could help the state 
increase the effective and legitimate provision of governance services (e.g. in public health, the 
environment, or technical standard setting; cf. Mayntz/Scharpf 1995a; Kooiman 1993; Leibfried/
Zürn 2005). 20 years later, students of international relations came to a similar conclusion 
discussing possibilities of “governance without government” (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992). 
While there seems to be an increasing demand for governance with/out the state both within 
and beyond the state, its promise to compensate for state weakness or state failure appears 
to rest on two major premises. On the one hand, the state has to possess sufficient capacities 
in terms of both resources and autonomy to cast a credible shadow of hierarchy, giving non-
state actors an incentive to cooperate and allaying state actors’ fear of being captured. On the 
other hand, these state capacities must not be too strong, in order to provide an incentive for 
state actors to seek cooperation with non-state actors. In other words, what is required to make 
governance with/out the state work is a medium shadow of hierarchy (cf. Börzel 2007; Börzel 
2010). 
Rather than decline or extinction, we find a transformation of the state retaining a key role as a 
“governance broker” (Herrschaftsmanager, Genschel/Zangl 2008), “coordinator” (Mayntz 2004: 
75), or “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1997; cf. Rhodes 1996; Jessop 1998). In order to fulfill 
these roles, a state requires statehood, i.e. the capacity to make and enforce collectively binding 
rules, with the monopoly on force as the ultima ratio of its coercive power. Statehood provides 
state actors with a unique resource or “institutional competence” (Schuppert 2010: 17) to solve 
societal problems, such as the provision of security and order, the (re)allocation of values or the 
safeguarding of economic stability. “Governance needs government” (Schuppert 2010: 128). The 
(shadow of ) statehood is not only important for the effective provision of common goods but 
also for its legitimacy (Sonderforschungsbereich 700 2009: 5).
If governance without the state still requires statehood, governance research hardly travels 
to areas of limited statehood, where states by definition are unable to hierarchically impose 
collectively binding rules. Moreover, countries in areas of limited statehood appear to be 
doomed: the more limited their statehood, the greater the need becomes for governance with/
out the state in order to compensate for state weakness or state failure, but the less likely it is 
to emerge. This dilemma or paradox is reinforced if there is indeed a dialectical relationship 
between the evolution of a strong state and a strong society as it is implicitly assumed or 
explicitly claimed by the governance literature (cf. Tilly 1975; Mayntz 1993).
Research at the SFB 700 has demonstrated that non-state actors do engage in governance in 
areas of limited statehood. Transnational companies and non-governmental organizations are 
key providers of governance services when states are too weak to deliver and cast a shadow of 
How Much Statehood Does it Take – And What For? |  6
hierarchy (cf. Risse 2011). There are other ways to induce non-state actors to provide governance 
services that do not rely on the capacity of a state to cast a credible shadow of hierarchy (cf. 
Börzel 2010; Börzel/Risse 2010).
The risk of anarchy, the threat of external intervention, the pressures of the international or 
local community, or efficiency gains and competitive (dis)advantages have been key drivers for 
the governance contributions of non-state actors in areas of limited statehood. Yet, they all 
rely on some form of consolidated statehood. Markets do not function without (some) state 
regulation. It is foreign states or international (a.k.a. interstate) organizations that commit 
transnational actors to participate in effective governance. And community pressure is most 
effective when community members can voice and address their claims to state institutions 
or when international organizations and foreign states take up their claims and exert pressure 
from above (Brysk 1993; Keck/Sikkink 1998b).
This paper explores how much statehood it takes to make governance with/out the state 
work. The first part discusses the relationship between governance, state, and statehood. The 
distinction between governance as structure and governance as process allows us to disentangle 
state and statehood. The second part of the paper explores the different functions statehood 
has for governance. While there may be functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, 
there is more to statehood than the threat of hierarchically imposing regulation. Effective and 
legitimate governance may require at least some (external) form of consolidated statehood. The 
final part of the paper discusses varieties of statehood and argues that the challenge for areas 
of limited statehood is not the lack of exclusivity of statehood but the need for an order of 
shared and divided statehood. The paper concludes by considering the dark sides of statehood, 
cautioning against building states without strengthening the rule of law and democracy.
2. Governance, State, and Statehood
This paper adopts the governance definition of the SFB 700 as institutionalized modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods. 
Thus, governance consists of both structures and processes (Scharpf 1997: 97; Mayntz/Scharpf 
1995b: 19). Governance in terms of structure relates to the institutions and actor constellations. 
Here, the literature usually distinguishes between hierarchy, market (competition systems),1 
and networks (negotiation systems).2  These are ideal types, which differ with regard to the type 
1 In the political science literature, markets are not regarded as governance since they are a “sponta-
neous order” (Hayek 1967) that leaves “no place for ‘conscious, deliberate and purposeful’ efforts to 
craft formal structures” (Williamson 1996). Yet, market mechanisms can be institutionalized to coordi-
nate actors’ behavior through competition (cf. Benz 2007). This paper uses the concept of competition 
systems to describe the institutionalization of market-based modes of political coordination.
2 The governance literature has identified other forms of social order, such as clans 
     (cf. Ouchi1980) and associations (cf. Schmitter/Streeck 1985). Like networks, this paper conceptualizes 
them as negotiation systems (see below).
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of actors involved and the degree of coupling between them. Governance as process points to 
the modes of social coordination by which actors seek to achieve changes in (mutual) behavior. 
Hierarchical coordination usually takes the form of authoritative decisions (e.g. administrative 
ordinances, court decisions). Actors must obey. Non-hierarchical coordination, by contrast, is 
based on voluntary commitment and compliance. Conflicts of interests are solved by negotiations. 
Voluntary agreement is either achieved by negotiating a compromise and granting mutual 
concessions (side payments and issue linkage) on the basis of fixed preferences (bargaining), or 
actors can engage in processes of non-manipulative persuasion (arguing), through which they 
develop common interests and change their preferences accordingly (Risse 2012). 
Institutions are crucial in shaping both governance structures and governance processes. On the 
one hand, they determine the degree of coupling between actors by defining their relationships 
and allocating resources to them. On the other hand, institutions set the framework for the 
modes of coordination on which actors draw (cf. Scharpf 1997). In hierarchical structures, for 
instance, hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of coordination can be used. Institutions 
bestow upon state actors the power to unilaterally impose decisions, but they can refrain from 
invoking their hierarchical authority when they bargain or argue with others. Negotiation and 
competition systems, by contrast, can only rely on bargaining and arguing. Which mode of 
coordination actors choose within their institutional limits is, again, influenced by institutions, 
which render certain modes more appropriate or socially acceptable than others. 
2.1 State vs. Statehood
Distinguishing between governance as a structure and governance as a process helps us delin-
eate state from statehood. The state is a hierarchical structure of political authority. Unlike other 
structures of political authority, such as empires or city leagues, the state has fixed borders and 
holds the claim to absolute authority based on the monopoly on force, which institutionalizes a 
hierarchical relationship between state actors that exercise authority (ruler, government) and all 
other actors within the state territory (cf. Spruyt 1994). Statehood is a property. Its essence is the 
ability of the state to enforce collectively binding decisions, ultimately through coercive means 
guaranteed by the monopoly on the means of violence. Thus, the Western governance literature 
draws an implicit link between hierarchy and the state. It follows closely from Max Weber’s 
conceptualization of statehood as an institutionalized authority structure with the ability to 
steer hierarchically (Herrschaftsverband) and to legitimately control the means of violence (Ge-
waltmonopol, cf. Weber 1921/1980). While no state governs hierarchically all the time, states at 
least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a 
collectivity. In other words, states command what Stephen Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” 
i.e. “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public au-
thorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” (Krasner 1999, 4). 
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Non-state actors also have the capacity of hierarchical coordination and may monopolize the 
use of force. However, state actors hold an institutionalized (claim to the) monopoly on force 
that they must put to use exclusively for the provision of common goods. They have the author-
ity to hierarchically provide common goods or command their provision by others. Thus, state 
actors do not only command privileged resources for hierarchical coordination (“Herrschafts-
ressourcen,” Genschel/Zangl 2008: 4). Their public mandate obliges them to act in the public 
interest and makes them politically accountable and legally liable in case of failure (Scharpf 
1991: 630).3  In other words, what makes state actors special is that they can rely on statehood, i.e. 
the legitimate monopoly on force and the creation of collectively binding rules, to hierarchi-
cally coordinate the provision of common goods. What’s more, they have the legal obligation 
to use their authority of hierarchical coordination to ensure the provision of common goods. 
Rather than asking how much state it takes to make governance work, we should rather ask to 
what extent the effective and legitimate provision of common goods relies on statehood as a 
particular form of hierarchical coordination that companies, non-governmental organizations, 
traditional chiefs, or war lords by definition cannot acquire – without turning into state actors. 
The focus on statehood rather than the state is in line with the governance literature, which 
emphasizes the “shadow of hierarchy” as a major prerequisite for non-state actors to engage in 
governance. 
2.2 Statehood and the Shadow of Hierarchy
The shadow of hierarchy is generated when state actors credibly threaten the unilateral adop-
tion and enforcement of collectively binding rules on the provision of common goods and their 
unilateral provision, respectively, if non-state actors are not willing to engage in governance.
This threat generates major incentives for non-state actors to engage in non-hierarchical co-
ordination and self-coordination (cf. Scharpf 1997; Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b). Non-hierarchical 
coordination entails high transaction costs for the non-state actors involved. Not being institu-
tionally committed to the provision of common goods, they are not necessarily inclined to bear 
such costs. If the policy outcome does not fully correspond to their preferences, it may take the 
threat of a hierarchically imposed decision in order to tip non-state actors’ cost-benefit calcula-
tions in favor of a voluntary agreement closer to the common good rather than particularistic 
self-interests. Moreover, the possibility of hierarchical intervention reduces the incentive for 
non-state actors to renege on their voluntary commitment. This is particularly true for the 
self-coordination of non-state actors. Business associations or societal networks rarely have 
the sufficient sanctioning capacities to deter opportunistic behavior of their members in the 
3 This mandate does not necessarily have to be democratically legitimate. For instance, policy delegation 
can hold independent regulatory agencies or professional associations accountable to the public inte-
rest. Moreover, public actors or governments do not always act in the public interest, nor do they have 
to be intrinsically motivated to do so. Yet, unlike private actors, they have to justify their actions to the 
public and face political and legal sanctions and/or a loss of legitimacy.
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implementation of voluntary agreements (free-rider problem). Therefore, we hardly ever find 
societal self-coordination without the involvement of state actors that have the capacity to make 
and enforce unilateral decisions. Finally, opportunistic behavior by non-state actors is rendered 
less likely if state actors review the negotiation outcomes and ensure that they correspond to 
the common good. This is most important if companies, professional associations, pressure 
groups, or consultancies are involved. Unlike state actors and not-for-profit organizations (e.g. 
public interest groups), they are not obliged by formal institutions or social norms to pursue 
the common good.4
There is enough empirical evidence to show that the shadow of hierarchy cast by consolidated 
statehood is key in making non-state actors contribute to governance (Héritier/Rhodes 2010; 
Héritier/Lehmkuhl 2008; Börzel 2009; Mayntz/Scharpf 1995a). Yet, the focus on the shadow of 
hierarchy suffers from a serious theoretical shortcoming: it reduces the role of the state to the 
regulation and enforcement of collectively binding rules for the provision of common goods. 
While the traditional or ‘heroic’ state might have been a regulator and enforcer, the modern 
state has transformed itself into a governance manager (Kooiman 1993; Genschel/Zangl 2008) 
or governance arena (Kohler-Koch 1996). Rather than hierarchically coordinating or mandating 
the provision of common goods, state actors seek to involve non-state actors to achieve more ef-
fective and legitimate governance (cf. Mayntz 1993; Kooiman 1993; Jessop 1998). Non-state actors 
help identify relevant problems and contribute to the formulation of adequate policy solutions. 
Moreover, the more the actors affected by a policy have a say in decision making, the more likely 
they are to accept the policy outcome implemented, even if their interests may not have been 
fully accommodated. 
The non-hierarchical coordination of non-state actors in the governance process increases the 
intervention capacity of the state and can be described as the “state-organized unburdening of 
the state” (Offe 2009: 555, emphasis in the original), which entails its transformation rather than 
its demise. The role of state actors as governance moderators and managers may rely on their 
ability to resort to non-hierarchical coordination based on statehood to be effective. But even if 
it does not, non-hierarchical coordination by the state still requires some capacities, a.k.a. state-
hood. A lack of administrative, financial, cognitive and human resources not only weakens the 
credibility of state actors to unilaterally adopt and impose costly policies (shadow of hierarchy). 
It also prevents them from acting as reliable partners to non-state actors in the provision of 
common goods and fosters a fear of agency capture, making state actors reluctant to engage 
with more resourceful actors to begin with (Börzel 2009). 
4 This is not to say that state actors are motivated to pursue the common good and always do so. But 
unlike business or interest groups, governments (and non-governmental organizations) can be held 
accountable and face legal and/or social sanctions, if they abuse their legal or moral authority to pur-
sue private self-interests.
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Moreover, the state often provides basic governance services, such as infrastructure or security, 
which are necessary for non-state actors to engage in governance in the first place. Finally, the 
state is still the major source of legitimacy for governance. In other words, there is more to 
statehood than casting a shadow of hierarchy. 
3. Statehood: What For?
Research at the SFB 700 has shown that non-state actors do engage in governance in areas of 
limited statehood, where the state is too weak to provide common goods. Even multinational 
companies, which are considered least likely cases, often engage in the provision of common 
goods (Börzel/Héritier 2012; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010; Flohr et al. 2010). They do not only adopt 
global standards to govern their worldwide business activities (Epstein/Roy 2007; Prakash/Po-
toski 2006b, Prakash/Potoski 2007), but also voluntarily implement environmental protection 
standards, provide HIV/AIDS-related services, or agree to use sustainable energy (Flohr et al. 
2010). In some instances, they even regulate their own supply chains (Héritier et al. 2009) and 
seek to foster state regulation by pushing for stricter legislation and helping to strengthen the 
enforcement capacity of state actors (Vogel/Kagan 2004; Flanagan 2006; Mol 2001; Börzel et al. 
2011).
What is less clear, however, is whether governance without the state requires statehood. The 
literature has identified several functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy that provide 
sufficient incentives for non-state actors to engage in governance (cf. Börzel 2010; Börzel/Risse 
2010; Börzel/Héritier 2012). 
3.1 Functional Equivalents to the Shadow of Hierarchy
3.1.1 The Shadow of Anarchy 
While the state’s threat of unilaterally providing a common good serves as a key incentive for 
non-state actors to get involved, the opposite situation may produce the same effect. If state ac-
tors are incapable of adopting and enforcing collectively binding decisions, companies are not 
confronted with a situation in which they have to weigh the costs of cooperation and voluntary 
commitment against the possibility of a suboptimal hierarchically imposed policy. Rather, they 
face the danger of not having a common good at all. If the pursuit of their individual profit 
depends on the provision of certain common goods and collectively binding rules to produce 
them, and if the government is not able or willing to provide them, companies have a major 
incentive to step in. Thus, multinational companies in South Africa have heavily invested in the 
fight against HIV/AIDS, both at the individual and the associational level (cf. Börzel et al. 2007; 
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Müller-Debus et al. 2010). In the absence of a functioning public health system including pub-
lic education on the risks of the pandemic, companies have been stepping in to provide health 
and education services not only for their workers, but also for the workers’ families and the 
larger communities. The same holds true for transnational public-private partnerships provid-
ing multiple governance services in areas of limited statehood (Beisheim et al. 2008). As its an-
tipode, the “shadow of anarchy” may serve as a functional equivalent to the shadow of hierarchy 
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b: 23, Fn. 5; cf. Müller-Debus 2010). 
3.1.2 The External Shadow of Hierarchy 
While the shadow of anarchy provides one substitute for the shadow of hierarchy, the latter can 
also be generated externally. International organizations and foreign governments can commit 
non-governmental actors to the common good. 
First, external actors directly exercise domestic sovereignty including a monopoly on the means 
of violence and the enforcement of decisions authoritatively in modern protectorates from 
Bosnia to Afghanistan. These are areas of limited statehood where states have lost their “West-
phalian” sovereignty or where it is severely circumscribed. The jury is still out whether foreign 
actors can exercise sustainable and effective governance under these circumstances (for con-
flicting views see e.g. Paris 2004; Fearon/Laitin 2004; Zisk Marten 2004; Schneckener 2010). 
Moreover, the emerging international norm of the “responsibility to protect” can be invoked if 
a state is either not willing or not able to provide even a minimum degree of governance. As a 
result, the international community has at least the legal right to intervene and provide gover-
nance if everything else fails.
Second, under international law, NGOs, companies, and local actors can be obliged to comply 
with standards of good governance in areas of limited statehood (Ladwig/Rudolf 2010). The le-
gal principle of agency of necessity (negotiorum gestio, see Bühring/Hüfken 2008) implies that 
one actor replaces another who is unable to take the necessary action. Third actors who then 
provide governance are obligated by the same rules as the state government that is no longer 
capable of living up to international standards. In other words, standards of international law 
hold non-state actors accountable to providing governance under conditions of limited state-
hood. Whether this results in effective and sustainable governance, however, is an altogether 
different question.
Finally, national governments of the (consolidated and democratic) states where multinational 
companies and transnational NGOs have their headquarters may also force non-state actors to 
contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood. In this particular case, home country 
laws are in place and enforceable, requiring non-state actors such as companies to comply with 
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standards of good governance or other regulations (e.g. environmental laws) irrespective of 
where they invest or act.
3.1.3 The Shadow of the (Socially Embedded) Market
Not only can NGOs mobilize international organizations (IOs) and foreign governments to 
make companies engage in the provision of common goods, but they can also launch interna-
tional campaigns directly naming and shaming companies into complying with their commit-
ments. This can be particularly harmful to the reputation of companies that have a brand name 
to protect and whose products target markets in (consolidated and democratic) states where 
consumers care about the provision of common goods (cf. Hönke et al. 2008; Müller-Debus et 
al. 2010). When it proves to be more profitable, companies enforce regulatory standards down 
their supply chain (Héritier et al. 2009) or lobby governments to adopt stricter standards to 
keep competitors out (Börzel et al. 2011). In a similar vein, the extractive industry in Africa has 
made joint ventures with Chinese mining companies conditioned upon the respect for certain 
social standards (cf. Hackenesch 2009). Environmental, social, and human rights norms have 
started to creep into the core business of many companies (see e.g. Prakash 2000; Prakash/
Potoski 2006a; Prakash/Potoski 2007). What is now being called “corporate social responsibil-
ity” actually means that firms are increasingly obliged to integrate environmental and human 
rights norms into their production, management, and general business practices (including 
risk management), even though their compliance record still varies enormously. Reputational 
concerns about socially accepted behavior induce firms to take norms more seriously. Norm 
compliance can then turn into a strategic advantage in competitive markets, leading to a “race 
to the top” with regard to regulatory standards (Börzel/Héritier 2012).
3.1.4 The Shadow of the (Traditional) Community
Social norms are not only institutionalized at the international level or in areas of consoli-
dated statehood. Traditional communities also have standards of human rights, even if they do 
not always fully conform to the global regimes. While African governments often do not care 
whether Chinese companies operating within their territory comply with human rights stan-
dards, local communities do (cf. Hackenesch 2009). Likewise, companies may be embedded in 
local communities defined by clan structures or business activities that share certain standards 
of appropriate behavior and may include the respect for (certain) human rights. South African 
mining companies, for instance, are subject to considerable peer pressure since one rotten 
apple can spoil the reputation of the entire sector, decreasing share value on the international 
stock markets (cf. Hönke 2008).
In these cases, local communities do not provide a shadow of hierarchy, but they expect non-
state actors – companies and NGOs alike – to comply with local governance norms and contrib-
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ute to the provision of collective goods, particularly when the central state institutions are too 
weak (or too corrupt) to govern. Non-compliance can quickly become costly for the non-state 
actors, particularly when the multi-level nature of governance in areas of limited statehood 
comes into play. In many cases, local communities are well connected to transnational advocacy 
networks of NGOs and international organizations and can link up with global civil society (for 
these mechanisms see Keck/Sikkink 1998a). The indigenous peoples of Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
linked up with the transnational human rights and environmental communities to denounce 
the behavior of the Shell Company, which had both ruined the environment and violated the 
human rights of local communities. As a result of these campaigns, Shell today is a different 
company that has fully embraced the norms of “corporate social responsibility,” even though 
compliance with these norms in the Niger Delta is still disputed (Zimmer 2010). This example 
shows how the norms of local communities and the social embeddedness of markets can work 
together to force non-state actors to contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood.
The literature provides ample evidence for the existence of functional equivalents to the shad-
ow of hierarchy cast by governments drawing on consolidated statehood. Yet, they still appear 
to rely on some forms of consolidated statehood.
While the shadow of anarchy is defined by the absence of a state, the external shadow of hier-
archy still requires consolidated statehood, e.g. in the home country of a multinational cor-
poration. Since the shadow of anarchy provides crucial incentives for companies to engage in 
governance while the external shadow of hierarchy makes them honor their commitment, the 
two functional equivalents may complement and actually reinforce each other. In this case then, 
the multi-level nature of governance in areas of limited statehood provides a functional equiva-
lent to consolidated statehood’s ability to cast a shadow of hierarchy. This does not require a 
coercive intrusion into a state’s “Westphalian” sovereignty (Krasner 2004), which usually meets 
with stiff resistance, especially in weak and fragile states. Rather, the international community 
and/or Western consolidated states use their shadow of hierarchy to make non-state actors such 
as firms and NGOs engage in governance and provide public services in areas of limited state-
hood. In some cases, these actors rather than external states or international organizations even 
exercise legitimate authority (Herrschaft) in the absence of a state able to exert effective control 
(Koehler/Zürcher 2007).
The shadow of the market can put the non-provision of common goods at a significant com-
petitive dis¬advantage; yet, such economic incentives depend on the social embeddedness of 
markets, in which the demand of consumers is also influenced by moral obligations. They are 
particularly effective on multinational corporations that have a “brand name” to protect and 
that cater to high end markets in (consolidated and democratic) states where consumers care 
about the provision of common goods (see above).
The shadow of the community, finally, is most effective if the claims of local actors resonate 
with norms legalized by international institutions and are picked up by foreign states or inter-
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national organizations, which in turn exert pressure on non-state actors from above (Brysk 1993; 
Keck/Sikkink 1998b).
Overall, the various shadows do not only mix – they also all require some form of consolidated 
statehood to deploy their effects in areas of limited statehood. The good news is, however, that 
external statehood is sufficient. Thus, it is the multi-level nature of governance, linking areas 
of consolidated and limited statehood, which provides a functional equivalent to the shadow of 
hierarchy that areas of limited statehood are often unable to generate. While governance config-
urations may differ, they most likely involve actors that rely – directly or indirectly – on consoli-
dated statehood (Beisheim et al. 2011b; Risse 2012). External governments use their consolidated 
statehood to set and enforce (inter)national norms and rules for non-state actors operating in 
areas of limited statehood. Likewise, their regulations provide for domestic markets where the 
demand of consumers for CSR translates into competitive (dis)advantages for transnational 
companies. But can multilevel governance compensate for lacking statehood when it comes to 
the other functions of the state in providing governance?
3.2 Statehood and Its Functions
3.2.1 Internalizing Negative Externalities vs. Providing Common Goods
The shadow of hierarchy relates to the role of the state as regulator and enforcer. Facing the 
threat of the state hierarchically setting and enforcing collectively binding rules, non-state ac-
tors voluntarily commit themselves to self-regulation or engage in co-regulation with state ac-
tors. Such regulation, however, tends to target negative externalities in the production of private 
goods rather than the provision of common goods itself. True, states may delegate the provision 
of governance services to non-state actors. Yet, providing common goods (e.g. building and 
running an HIV/AIDS clinic) is usually far more costly than internalizing negative externali-
ties (e.g. reducing environmental pollution). Moreover, while companies increasingly accept the 
necessity to reduce harmful effects of their economic activities, they are at best willing to help 
state actors build the capacity to provide common goods (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010). Likewise, the 
privatization of public services (e.g. in the provision of drinking water) is often not considered 
legitimate by the public. Next to high costs and low acceptance, the direct provision of common 
goods also requires significant capacities, particularly if they are complex. A vaccination cam-
paign is less demanding than fighting HIV/AIDS (Schäferhoff 2011). There is a reason why the 
provision of public goods is still seen as a core task of the state (Grimm 1996; Leibfried/Zürn 
2005). Statehood entails both the normative obligations and the necessary capacities.
Our empirical evidence seems to suggest that only in the shadow of anarchy are non-state ac-
tors willing to heavily invest in the provision of common goods. If the state is not capable of 
protecting the health of its workers or of ensuring the security of people’s property, companies 
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start building medical facilities and employing security forces (Börzel/Héritier 2012; Hönke 
2009). The other shadows may simply not be strong enough to turn companies into providers 
of public health or security. Other non-state actors may have the motivation but often lack the 
capacity to act in the first place. What the shadow of the market and the community may do, 
however, is improve the quality of the collective goods once non-state actors have made the 
choice to provide them. Quality control is another important function attributed to the shadow 
of hierarchy: supervising the inclusiveness, sustainability, and potential negative externalities 
of non-state governance contributions. Companies, warlords, or tribes tend to provide club 
rather than public goods. Moreover, their governance contributions may produce significant 
negative externalities, when the security of a company negatively affects the security and hu-
man rights of local communities (Hönke/Thomas 2012). While this is less of an issue for non-
governmental organizations and public-private partnerships, these actors also face problems 
of sustainability, particularly with regard to complex tasks such as the fight against HIV/AIDS.
If states are so weak that they delegate or leave the provision of common goods to non-state 
actors, they can hardly be expected to resume or take on responsibility in cases of non-state 
failure. Yet, naming and shaming by NGOs and local communities, combined with pressure by 
international organizations and foreign states, can significantly increase the (reputational) costs 
of reneging on a commitment to engage in governance in areas of limited statehood.
3.2.2 Providing Common Goods
Non-state actors are more likely to internalize negative externalities in the production of pri-
vate goods than provide common goods. But their governance contributions may require the 
provision of some (basic) common goods, such as political stability and security, from the be-
ginning (Beisheim et al. 2011b). While companies are often unwilling to invest in conflict zones, 
non-governmental organizations require a minimum of security for their workers and basic 
infrastructure for them to move around (cf. Schäferhoff 2011). In principle, such governance 
services do not have to come from state actors in areas of limited statehood, which almost by 
definition lack the capacity to provide them. Yet, even if external actors are willing to fill in, they 
usually involve consolidated states either participating in UN missions or sending their own 
troops – we have yet to see the delegation of military interventions to private security compa-
nies, which would still operate under the shadow of hierarchy of the international community. 
The same is true for other common goods, such as the rule of law. In addition to subscribing 
to international institutions, weak states have started to lock in domestic reforms in regional 
institutions (Pevehouse 2005) and set up regional courts to ensure the legal certainty that many 
companies require to do business in areas of limited statehood (Alter 2012). Yet, to be credible, 
regional organizations have to include at least some member states with sufficient statehood to 
enforce regional norms and rules (Nigeria in ECOWAS, South Africa in SADC). 
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Warlords are an interesting case of non-state actors who acquired statehood. In some areas of 
Afghanistan, for instance, they have managed to establish a monopoly on the means of violence 
and possess significant capacities to set and enforce collectively binding rules. The same is true 
for the Taliban (Koehler 2012). What these actors often lack, however, is legitimacy, both external 
and internal.
3.2.3 Providing Legitimacy
Non-state actors can certainly substitute the capacity to set and enforce collectively binding 
rules, and, at times, even establish a monopoly over the means of violence in a given territory. 
Whether they use these properties to provide common goods, however, is a different question. 
More often than not, warlords, clan chiefs, and local strong men appear to abuse their statehood 
in order to consolidate their power and increase their private wealth. Even if they do provide 
effective governance, the question of legitimacy remains. It would go beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss the normative criteria that these non-state actors must meet in order to claim 
legitimacy (Jacob et al. 2012). When it comes to empirical legitimacy, i.e. social acceptance, the 
beneficiaries of governance services provided by non-state actors still seem to expect the state to 
take over, at least in the long run (Sonderforschungsbereich 700 2009: 5; Beisheim et al. 2011b). 
This coincides with the mind-set of many non-state actors, who are happy to help build the 
governance capacities of states but have no intention of substituting for them (Deitelhoff/Wolf 
2010). Likewise, the international community engages in state-building in order to strengthen 
the capacity of state actors to provide common goods (Brozus 2007).
4. Governance without Statehood?
4.1Varieties of Statehood
The paper has argued that governance without the state can work but may still require state-
hood. This is not necessarily a contradiction since statehood is a property not confined to states, 
as the historical examples of the ancient Roman Empire and the medieval Franconian and Ger-
man Empires show. The difference between these examples and the Westphalian state lies in 
the openness of their territorial borders. Moreover, the emperor’s statehood was not exclusive, 
but rather divided and shared with subordinate rulers, feudal tenants, and the church, which all 
engaged in governance. In this respect, they resemble the modern state, which shares its state-
hood with international (UN, WTO), regional (EU, ECOWAS), and subnational organizations 
(regions, provinces, federal states) on the one hand, and non-state actors (independent regula-
tory agencies, chambers, associations) on the other (Chayes/Chayes 1995; Leibfried/Zürn 2005; 
Beisheim et al. 2011a). With the modern state voluntarily delegating parts of its Westphalian and 
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domestic sovereignty to non-state actors, it only retains exclusive international sovereignty. So 
do areas of limited statehood, although here the statehood is contested by rather than shared 
with other actors. Thus, their problem is not that they lack exclusive statehood –the Westpha-
lian state is clearly the odd one out. What is missing is an institutionalized, uncontested “dis-
tribution of labor” between state and non-state actors in the provision of common goods. Since 
statehood is limited, state actors can neither hierarchically impose an order of divided and 
shared rule, nor can they settle conflicts and contestation (Beisheim et al. 2011a). Instead, they 
are circumvented (Schäferhoff 2011) or challenged (Koehler/Wilke 2011; Koehler 2012). To what 
extent external actors can provide such “meta governance” (Peters 2010) – without resorting to 
consolidated statehood – remains an open question. 
4.2 The Dark Sides of Statehood
While some sort of (external) statehood might be required to make governance in areas of limit-
ed statehood work, statehood as the capacity for a particular form of non-hierarchical coordina-
tion is not superior per se to other modes of governance. Fritz Scharpf has convincingly argued 
that in principle, hierarchy is superior to negotiation and competition systems due to its capac-
ity to solve distributional conflicts (Scharpf 1997; cf. Schuppert 2010: 14-32). At the same time, 
he has also shown that the performance of different forms of governance, including hierarchy, 
depends on certain scope conditions, which are only seldom fully met. This may explain why 
we usually find configurations of different actors and modes rather than ideal types. It should 
also caution us against idealizing or prioritizing statehood over other forms of hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical governance. Afghanistan is a clear example of state and non-state actors 
abusing their respective statehood. Unrestrained statehood is prone to despotism. It is the rule 
of law and democracy which have tamed the Leviathan. The D2 project of the SFB 700, “Com-
panies and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” therefore asks to what extent the participation 
of companies in governance and the quality of their governance contributions depend not only 
on the degree of limitation but also the restraint (through legal structures and checks on power) 
of statehood.5 The failure of the EU to support democratic forces in the Arab world is a clear 
example of how building up statehood without strengthening the rule of law and democracy 
is likely to result in bad rather than good governance (Börzel/van Hüllen 2011). Statehood is at 
best a necessary but certainly not a sufficient condition for effective and legitimate governance.
5 http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/teilprojekte/projektbereich_d/d2/index.html, last access March 5, 
2012.
How Much Statehood Does it Take – And What For? |  18
Literature
Alter, Karen J. 2012: The Global Spread of European Style International Courts, in: West Euro-
pean Politics 35: 1, 135-154.
Beisheim, Marianne/Börzel, Tanja A./Genschel, Philipp/Zangl, Bernhard 2011a: Governance jenseits 
des Staates. Das Zusammenspiel staatlicher und nicht-staatlicher Governance, in: Beis-
heim, Marianne/Börzel, Tanja A./Genschel, Philipp/Zangl, Bernhard (Eds.) 2011a: Wozu 
Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter und konsolidierter Staatlichkeit, Baden-Ba-
den, 251-266.
Beisheim, Marianne/Börzel, Tanja A./Genschel, Philipp/Zangl, Bernhard (Eds.) 2011b: Wozu Staat? Go-
vernance in Räumen begrenzter und konsolidierter Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden.
Beisheim, Marianne/Liese, Andrea/Ulbert, Cornelia 2008: Transnationale öffentlich-private Partner-
schaften - Bestimmungsfaktoren für die Effektivität ihrer Governance-Leistungen, in: 
Schuppert, Gunnar Folke/Zürn, Michael (Eds.) 2008: Governance in einer sich wandeln-
den Welt. PVS - Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 41, Wiesbaden, 452-474.
Benz, Arthur 2007: Politischer Wettbewerb, in: Benz, Arthur/Lütz, Susanne/Schimank, Uwe/Simo-
nis, Georg (Eds.) 2007: Handbuch Governance. Theoretische Grundlagen und empiri-
sche Anwendungsfelder, Wiesbaden, 54-67.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2007: Regieren ohne den Schatten der Hierarchie. Ein modernisierungstheo-
retischer Fehlschluss?, in: Lehmkuhl, Ursula/Risse, Thomas (Eds.) 2007: Regieren ohne 
Staat? Governance in den Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit Baden-Baden, 41-63.
Börzel, Tanja A. (Ed.) 2009: Coping with Accession to the European Union. New Modes of Envi-
ronmental Governance, Houndmills.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2010: Governance with(out) Government - False Promises or Flawed Premises, 
SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 23, Berlin.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2010: Governance without a State - Can it Work?, in: Regulation and 
Governance 4: 2, 113–134.
Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne (Eds.) 2012: Racing to the Top? Business and Governance in 
South Africa, London.
Börzel, Tanja A./ Héritier, Adrienne/Hönke, Jana/Kranz, Nicole 2008: Fostering Environmental Regu-
lation? Corporate Social Responsibility in Countries with Weak Regulatory Capacities. 
The Case of South Africa, SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 9, Berlin.
Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne/Kranz, Nicole/Thauer, Christian 2011: Racing to the Top? Regula-
tory Competition among Firms in Areas of Limited Statehood, in: Risse, Thomas (Ed.) 
2011: Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
New York, NY, 144-170.
Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne/Müller-Debus, Anna 2007: Der Regulierungsbeitrag von Großun-
ternehmen in Kampf gegen HIV/AIDS in Südafrika, in: Lehmkuhl, Ursula/Risse, Tho-
mas (Eds.) 2007: Regieren ohne Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit, 
Baden Baden, 272-291.
Börzel, Tanja A./Müller-Debus, Anna/Thauer, Christian 2010: Firms, Associations and the Gover-
nance of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 3: 2, 162-182.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 29 • March 2012  |  19
Börzel, Tanja A./van Hüllen, Vera 2011: Good Governnce and Bad Neighbours. The End of Trans-
formative Power Europe?, KFG Working Paper Series No. 35, Berlin.
Brozus, Lars 2007: Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit als Problem der Politik, in 
Lehmkuhl, Ursula/Risse, Thomas (Eds.) 2007: Regieren ohne Staat? Governance in Räu-
men begrenzter Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden, 374-391.
Brysk, Alison 1993: From Above and From Below: Social Movements, the International System, 
and Human Rights in Argentina, in: Comparative Political Studies 26: 3, 259-285.
Bühring, Ferry/Hüfken, Nina 2008: Menschenrechtsstandards für Governance in schwachen und 
zerfallen(d)en Staaten, in: De la Rosa, Sybille/Höppner, Ulrike/Kötter, Matthias (Eds.) 
2008: Transdisziplinäre Governanceforschung. Gemeinsam hinter den Staat blicken, 
Baden-Baden, 187-208.
Chayes, Abram/Chayes, Antonia Handler 1995: The New Sovereignty. Compliance with Internatio-
nal Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, MA.
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto/Rosenau, James N. (Eds.) 1992: Governance Without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics, Cambridge.
Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus-Dieter (Eds.) 2010: Corporate Security Responsibility? Corporate Go-
vernance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of Conflict, Houndmills.
Epstein, Marc J./Roy, Marie-Josée 2007: Implementing a Corporate Environmental Strategy. Esta-
blishing Coordination and Control within Multinational Companies, in: Business Stra-
tegy and the Environment 16: 6, 389-403.
Fearon, James D./Laitin, David D. 2004: Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, in:  In-
ternational Security 28: 4, 5-43.
Flanagan, Robert J. 2006: Globalization and Labour Conditions, Oxford.
Flohr, Annegret/ Rieth, Lothar/ Schwindenhammer, Sandra/Wolf, Klaus Dieter 2010: The Role of Busi-
ness in Global Governance. Corporations as Norm-Entrepreneurs, Basingstoke.
Genschel, Philipp/Zangl, Bernhard 2008: Metarmophosen des Staates - vom Herrschaftsmonopoli-
sten zum Herrschaftsmanager, in: Leviathan 36: 3, 430-454.
Grimm, Dieter (Ed.) 1996: Staatsaufgaben, Berlin.
Hackenesch, Christine 2009: China and the EU‘s Engagement in Africa: Setting the Stage for 
Cooperation, Competition or Conflict?, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
Discussion Paper No. 16, Bonn.
Héritier, Adrienne/Lehmkuhl, Dirk (Eds.) 2008: The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Gover-
nance, in: Special Issue Journal of Public Policy 28: 1, 1-17.
Héritier, Adrienne/ Müller-Debus, Anna/Thauer, Christian 2009: The Firm as an Inspector: Private 
Ordering and Political Rules, in: Business and Politics 11: 4, Art. 2.
Héritier, Adrienne/Rhodes, Martin (Eds.) 2010: New Modes of Governance in Europe. Governing in 
the Shadow of Hieararchy, Houndmills.
Hönke, Jana 2008: Transnational Mining Business in Areas of Limited Statehood – Patterns of 
an Extractive Orders in the Central African Copperbelt, in: Melber, Henning/Southall, 
Roger (Eds.) 2008: A New Scramble for Africa?, Durban.
Hönke, Jana 2009: Transnational Pockets of Territoriality. Governing the Security of Extraction 
in Katanga (DRC), Research Academy Leipzig Working Paper Series No. 2, Leipzig. 
How Much Statehood Does it Take – And What For? |  20
Hönke, Jana/ Thomas, Esther 2012: Governance for Whom? Capturing the Inclusiveness and Unin-
tended Effects of Governance by Business, SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 31, Berlin.
Jacob, Daniel/Ladwig, Bernd/Oldenbourg, Andreas 2012: Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 27, Berlin.
Jessop, Bob 1998: The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: the Case of Economic Deve-
lopment, in: International Social Sciences Journal 50: 155, 29-45.
Kagan, Robert/Vogel, David (Eds.) 2004: Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Af-
fects National Regulatory Policies, Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles, CA.
Keck, Margaret E./Sikkink, Kathryn 1998: Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in Interna-
tional Politics, Ithaca, NY.
Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph 2007: Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afgha-
nistan. SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 7, Berlin.
Koehler, Jan/Wilke, Boris 2011: Wie funktioniert Sicherheit ohne (viel) Staat? Befunde aus Nord-
ostafghanistan und Pakistan, in Beisheim, Marianne/Börzel, Tanja A./Genschel, Philipp/
Zangl, Bernhard (Eds.) 2011: Wozu Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter und konso-
lidierter Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden, 55-86.
Koehler, Jan 2012: Social Order Within and Beyond the Shadows of Hierarchy. Governance-
Patchworks in Afghanistan, SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 34, Berlin.
Kohler-Koch, Beate 1996: The Strength of Weakness. The Transformation of Governance in the 
EU, in: Gustavsson, Sverker/Lewin, Leif (Eds.) 1996: The Future of the Nation State. Es-
says on Cultural Pluralism and Political Integration, Stockholm.
Kooiman, Jan (Ed.) 1993: Modern Governance. New Government-Society Interactions, London.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999: Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ.
Krasner, Stephen D. 2004: Sharing Sovereignty. New Institutions for Collapsed and Failed States, 
in: International Security 29: 2, 85-120.
Ladwig, Bernd/Rudolf, Beate 2010: International Legal and Moral Standards of Good Governance 
in Fragile States, in: Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula (Eds.) 2010: Governance Without 
a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, New York, NY.
Leibfried, Stephan/Zürn, Michael (Eds.) 2005: Transformations of the State?, Cambridge.
Mayntz, Renate 1993: Modernization and the Logic of Interogranizational Networks, in: Child, 
John/Crozier, Michel/Mayntz, Renate (Eds.) 1993: Societal Change Between Market and 
Organization, Aldershot.
Mayntz, Renate 2004: Governance im modernen Staat, in: Benz, Arthur (Ed.) 2004: Governance - 
Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden.
Mayntz, Renate/Scharpf, Fritz W. (Eds.) 1995a: Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung und politische 
Steuerung, Frankfurt a.M..
Mayntz, Renate/Scharpf, Fritz W. 1995b: Steuerung und Selbstorganisation in staatsnahen Sekto-
ren, in: Mayntz, Renate/Scharpf, Fritz W. (Eds.) 1995b: Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulie-
rung und politische Steuerung, Frankfurt, New York, NY.
Mol, Arthur P. J. 2001: Globalization and Environmental Reforms: The Ecological Modernization 
of the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 29 • March 2012  |  21
Müller-Debus, Anna 2010: Collective Action of Firms. Motivation, Facilitation, Social Engage-
ment. A Comparative Analysis of Industry Behaviour in South Africa. PhD Thesis, Freie 
Universität Berlin, Berlin.
Offe, Claus 2009: Governance: An „Empty Signifier“?‘, in: Constellations 16: 4, 550-562.
Ouchi, William G. 1980: Market, Bureaucracies, and Clans, in: Administrative Science Quarterly 
25: 1, 129-141.
Paris, Roland 2004: At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge.
Peters, B. Guy 2010: Governing in the Shadows, SFB 700 Lecture Series No. 3, Berlin.
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005: Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization, 
Cambridge.
Potoski, Matthew/Prakash, Aseem 2006a: Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Gover-
nance, and ISO 14001, in: American Journal of Political Science 50: 2, 350-364.
Potoski, Matthew/Prakash, Aseem 2006b: The Voluntary Environmentalists: Green Clubs, ISO 
14001 and Voluntary Environmental Regulations, Cambridge.
Potoski, Matthew/Prakash, Aseem 2007: Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country Diffusion of ISO 
14001 Management Systems, in: International Studies Quarterly 51: 3, 723-744.
Prakash, Aseem 2000: Greening the Firm: The Politics of Corporate Environmentalism, Cam-
bridge.
Rhodes, Rod A.W. 1996: The New Governance: Governing without Government, in: Political Stu-
dies 44: 4, 652-667.
Risse, Thomas (Ed.) 2011: Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited 
Statehood, New York, NY.
Risse, Thomas 2012: Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood: Actors, Modes, 
Institutions, and Resources, SFB 700 Working Paper Series No. 32, Berlin.
Schäferhoff, Marco 2011: Die Bereitstellung von Gesundheitsleistungen in Räumen begrenzter 
Staatlichkeit. Ist der Staat entbehrlich?, in: Beisheim, Marianne/Börzel, Tanja A./Gen-
schel, Philipp/Zangl, Bernhard (Eds.), 2011: Was vom Staate übrig bleibt. Der staatliche 
Beitrag zu Governance, Baden-Baden, 117-143.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1991: Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhun-
derts, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 32: 4, 621-634.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1997: Games real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Re-
search, Boulder, CO.
Schmitter, Philippe C./Streeck, Wolfgang 1985: Community, Market and the State – and Associations? 
The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, in: European So-
ciological Review 1: 2, 119-138.
Schneckener, Ulrich 2010: Good Intentions, Poor Politics: International State-Building and Its Un-
intended Consequences, in: Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula (Eds.) 2010: Governance 
Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, New York, NY.
Schuppert, Gunnar Folke 2010: Staat als Prozess. Eine staatstheoretische Skizze in sieben Aufzü-
gen, Frankfurt a.M..
Sonderforschungsbereich 700 2009: Grundbegriffe der Governanceforschung, SFB 700 Working Pa-
per Series No. 8, 2nd revised edition, Berlin.
How Much Statehood Does it Take – And What For? |  22
Spruyt, Hendrik 1994: Institutional Selection in International relations: State Anarchy as Order, 
in: International Organization 48: 4, 527-557.
Tilly, Charles 1975: The Formation of the Nation State, Princeton, NJ.
von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1967: Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct, Chicago.
Weber, Max 1921/1980: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1996: The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford.
Zimmer, Melanie 2010: Oil Companies in Nigeria: Emerging Good Practice or Still Fuelling Con-
flict, in: Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus-Dieter (Eds.) 2010: Corporate Security Responsi-
bility?, Houndmills.
Zisk Marten, Kimberley 2004: Enforcing the Peace. Learning from the Imperial Past, New York, 
NY.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 29 • March 2012  |  23
Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Prigge, Judit 2011: Friedenswächter. Institutionen der Streitbeilegung bei den Amhara in Äthiopien, SFB Governance Wor-
king Paper Series, No. 28, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
Jacob, Daniel/Ladwig, Bernd/Oldenbourg, Andreas 2012: Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited 
Statehood, SFB Governance Working Paper Series, No. 27, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
Schmelzle, Cord 2011: Evaluating Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood. SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 26, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2011.
Börzel, Tanja A./Hönke, Jana 2011: From Compliance to Practice. Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 25, Re-
search Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2011.
Draude, Anke/Neuweiler, Sonja 2010: Governance in der postkolonialen Kritik. Die Herausforderung lokaler Vielfalt jenseits 
der westlichen Welt. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 24, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, May 2010.
 
Börzel, Tanja A. 2010: Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises? SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 23, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2010.
Wilke, Boris 2009: Governance und Gewalt. Eine Untersuchung zur Krise des Regierens in Pakistan am Fall Belutschistan, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 22, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2009.
Schneckener, Ulrich 2009: Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 21, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2009.
Mueller Debus, Anna Kristin/Thauer, Christina R./Börzel, Tanja A. 2009: Governing HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The Role of Firms, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 20, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2009.
Nagl, Dominik/Stange, Marion 2009: Staatlichkeit und Governance im Zeitalter der europäischen Expansion. Verwaltungs-
strukturen und Herrschaftsinstitutionen in den britischen und französischen Kolonialimperien, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 19, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2009.
Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin/Stahn, Andreas 2008: The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its 
Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 18, Research Center (SFB) 700, Ber-
lin, December 2008.
Koehler, Jan 2008: Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 17, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Fuhr, Harald (ed.) 2008: Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher Akteure. Entste-
hungsbedingungen, Effektivität und Legitimität sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, 
No. 16, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2008.
How Much Statehood Does it Take – And What For? |  24
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne 2008: Transitional Justice als Weg zu Frieden und Sicherheit. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 15, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, July 2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Dingwerth, Klaus 2008: Procedural Legitimacy and Private Transnational Governance. Are the Good Ones 
Doing Better?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 14, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2008.
Benecke, Gudrun/Branović, Željko/Draude, Anke 2008: Governance und Raum. Theoretisch-konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur 
Verräumlichung von Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 13, Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Berlin, May 2008.
Schuppert, Gunnar Folke 2008: Von Ko-Produktion von Staatlichkeit zur Co-Performance of Governance. Eine Skizze zu ko-
operativen Governance-Strukturen von den Condottieri der Renaissance bis zu Public Private Partnerships, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 12, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2008.
Trebesch, Christoph 2008: Economic Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 11, Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Berlin, May 2008.
Benecke, Gudrun/Friberg, Lars/Lederer, Markus/Schröder, Miriam 2008: From Public-Private Partnership to Market. The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) as a New Form of Governance in Climate Protection, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 10, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2008.
Hönke, Jana/Kranz, Nicole/Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne 2008: Fostering Environmental Regulation? Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Countries with Weak Regulatory Capacities. The Case of South Africa, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 9, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2008.
Sonderforschungsbereich 700 (ed.) 2007: Grundbegriffe. Ein Beitrag aus dem Teilprojekt A1, SFB-Governance Working Paper 
Series, No. 8, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2007.
Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph 2007: Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Re-
presentative Survey, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 7, DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, Octo-
ber 2007.
Schäferhoff, Marco/Campe, Sabine/Kaan, Christopher 2007: Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relati-
ons. Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 6, 
DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2007.
Risse, Thomas 2007: Regieren in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Zur „Reisefähigkeit“ des Governance-Konzeptes, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 5, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2007.
Ladwig, Bernd/Jugov, Tamara/Schmelzle. Cord 2007: Governance, Normativität und begrenzte Staatlichkeit, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 4, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2007.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 29 • March 2012  |  25
Kötter, Matthias 2007: Der Governance-Raum als Analysefaktor – am Beispiel von „Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit“, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 3, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2007.
Draude, Anke 2007: How to Capture Non-Western Forms of Governance: In Favour of an Equivalence Functionalist Observa-
tion of Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 2, Research Center 
(SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2007. [German version available]
Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula 2006: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Forms of Governance? Research Pro-
gram or the Research Center (SFB) 700, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 1, Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Berlin, December 2006. [German version available]
These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed versions via e-
mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.
How Much Statehood Does it Take – And What For? |  26
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 29 • March 2012  |  27
The Authors
Professor Tanja A. Börzel holds the Chair for Euro-
pean Integration at the Otto-Suhr-Institut for Politi-
cal Science, Freie Universität Berlin. She co-directs 
the Research College “The Transformative Power 
of Europe”. She mainly focusses on questions of 
governance and institutional change as a result of 
Europeanisation as well as on the diffusion of Eu-
ropean ideas and policies within and outside of the 
EU. The latter is part of her current research, which 
deals with the compliance with EU norms and rules in member states, acces-
sion countries and neighbouring countries. Within the SFB 700 Tanja Börzel 
co-directs the project D2 on “Business and Governance in Subsaharan Africa” 
and project B2 “Governance Export by Regional Organisations”.
Contact: boerzel@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Governance has become a central theme in social science 
research. The Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas 
of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of li-
mited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed 
states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of 
colonies. How and under what conditions can governance 
deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what 
problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and 
financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the 
Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the 
University of Potsdam, the European University Institute, 
the Hertie School of Governance, the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (SWP), and the Social Sci-
ence Research Center Berlin (WZB). 
Research Framework of the Research Center (SFB) 700 Partner Organizations of the Research Center (SFB) 700
Host University:
Freie Universität Berlin
University of Potsdam
Hertie School of Governance
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP)
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
